Supplemental Appendix for:

Can Candidates Activate or Deactivate the Economic Vote?
Evidence from Two Mexican Elections

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1. Variable Coding for Mexico's 2006 Presidential Election

Here I describe the variables used in the analysis of the economic vote in the 2006 Mexican presidential election. Note that the coding of the variables is the same across all three panel waves. As noted in the text, the data comes from the Mexico 2006 Panel Study. Further details about the measures of campaign exposure are presented in section 2.

Vote Intention/Report   0=Calderón, 1=Madrazo, 2=López Obrador

Economic Retrospection   "Since Fox became president, would you say the national economy has gotten better, has gotten worse, or stayed the same?"   0=A lot worse, .025=A little worse, 0.5=Stayed the same, 0.75=A little better, 1=A lot better

Panista/Priista/Perredista   0=Does not identify with the party, 1=Identifies with the party; Note: "leaners" are categorized as identifiers and "non-identifiers" are the base category in the analysis.

Privatization   "Do you believe that more private investment should be allowed in the electricity sector or that the electricity sector should remain almost completely in the hands of the government?" 0=Should remain in the hands of government, 1=More privatization should be allowed.

US Trade   "What would you prefer: that commercial relations between Mexico and the United States increase, decrease, or remain the same?" 0=Decrease, 0.5=Remain the Same, 1=Increase.

Security   "In general, what would you prefer?" 0=That the government be responsible for the well being of individuals, 1=That individuals be responsible for their own well being, 0.5=both.

Poverty   "In your opinion, what should the government do to reduce poverty?" 0=Give money to the poor and raise taxes on the rich, 1=Promote private investment and leave taxes as they are, 0.5=both/neither/create jobs.

Madrazo Probability	The perceived probability of a Madrazo victory is calculated using responses to: "How likely is it that [candidate] will win the elections in 2006?" 0=Totally certain he will lose, 0.33=Likely he will lose, 0.5=Don't know, 0.67=Likely he will win, 1=Totally certain he will win. Based on responses for each candidate, the probability equals (Madrazo likelihood)/(Madrazo likelihood + Calderón likelihood + López Obrador likelihood).
Interest in Politics	"How much interest do you have in politics?" 0=None, 0.33=A little, 0.66=Some, 1=A lot
Income	Socioeconomic status of the respondent's dwelling. 0=e, 0.25=d, c=.5, b=.75, a=1.
Female	0=Male, 1=Female
Religiosity	0=Does not belong to a religious association, 0.5=Non-active member, 1=Active member of a religious association
Light-Skinned	1=White or Light brown; 0=Dark brown or other
Total Ads	The total number of campaign ads run in the respondent's state between the May and July interview (weighted by daypart and interest in politics). Scaled from 0 to 1.
Economic Ads	The total number of economic campaign ads run in the respondent's state between the May and July interviews (weighted by content, daypart, and interest in politics). Scaled from 0 to 1.

2. Estimates of the Economic Vote

The multinomial logit estimates of the models used to generate the economic voting scores displayed in Figure 1 of the text are presented in Table A1.

<<TABLE A1 HERE>>

3. Measuring the Economic Message

3.1. Measuring advertising frequency

I compiled the ad frequency data based on the IFE's daily monitoring of campaign advertisements. The data record the time, date, price paid, and state of each televised ad. Data is available for Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Distrito Federal, Guanajuato, Guerrero,

Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacán, Nuevo León, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa, San Luis Potosí, Sonora, Tabasco, Veracruz, Yucatán. Based on these criteria, 35,191 ads aired in MX 2006. Of these, 19,986 were coded as economic ads.

In order to differentiate the potential impact of individual airings (e.g. a primetime ad versus a late fringe ad), I weight each airing by the time of day in which it was aired. To differentiate viewership by time slot without access to ratings data, I ordered slots based on the average cost per advertising-second. The weighting scheme is as follows:

Daypart Weight　　　　　　　0.3 = 2:00-6:00 AM, 0.4 = 6:00-10:00 AM, 0.5 = 10:00 AM-4:30 PM, 0.6 = 11:30 PM-2:00 AM, 0.7 = 4:30-7:30 PM, 0.8 = 7:30-8:00 PM, 0.9 = 11:00-11:30 PM, 1.0 = 8:00-11:00 PM.

Finally, to control for individual-level differences in the likelihood of being exposed to televised campaign ads, I weight each ad measure by the frequency with which respondents watch television. Wave1 respondents are asked how often they watch television news and soap operas each week (from "not at all" to "daily"). I combined the answers to these questions to create an exposure index. The scaled values from 0 to 1 are used as propensity measures to weight the state-level advertising totals.

3.2. Content analysis of televised advertisements and newspaper stories

In order to measure campaign content, I conducted an original content analysis of all candidate-sponsored presidential campaign advertisements. I limit the analysis to spots televised during the general election campaign and coded only those ads sponsored by the major candidates. I also exclude co-sponsored ads and ads sponsored by interest groups or the political party (not the candidate). I also exclude "unsponsored" ads. Video of the campaign spots were accessed from the Mexican *Instituto Federal Electoral*'s (IFE) website. I collected 307 television spots from the three major candidates for MX 2006. I coded each ad for any spoken mention of the economy. No visual elements—including written words—were coded. I then weighted each spot by the centrality of the economic message. The weighting scheme is

as follows: 1=The economy is of primary importance; 0.75=The economy is of secondary or tertiary importance; 0.5=The economy is of only minor importance; 0.25=The economy is mentioned only in passing; 0=No economic mention. I then combine the measure of campaign content with the measure of campaign effort by multiplying the content weight by the daypart weight. The sum of these scores by state captures the intensity of the economic message.

To control for the activating effect of economic news I also coded economic news. I content-coded stories published on the front page of *Reforma*, a leading national newspaper. I hand coded all front-page news stories for nine pre-election months. As a screening mechanism, I began by eliminating all front-page articles (50 words or more in length) that were neither economic nor political based on the headline. Next, I eliminated any article that made no mention of the domestic economy. The articles were then content coded and weighted using the method described above. In total, 95 economic stories were identified. The monthly totals are graphed in Figure A1 against the intensity of the economic message.

<<FIGURE A1 HERE>>

The results reveal that economic news was infrequent during the election campaign and did not lead the candidates' sudden turn to the economic message. The sudden shift in economic advertising, led by Calderón, is dramatic. These observed spikes in the dissemination of economic messages do not reflect the mere intensification of the campaign. In January and February, economic ads constituted only 16% of the overall message. This number jumps to 63% by the end of March and climbs to almost 70% by Election Day. I conclude, therefore, that economic news could not have primed the economic vote. By comparison, the pattern of economic intensification is consistent with the variation in the economic vote identified in the main text.

Data collected as part of the Mexico 2006 Panel Study confirms the absent economic message in the news media. First, content coding of televised news stories aired on Televisa

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and TV Azteca during the general election shows that fewer than 10% of stories mentioned the economy at all. Economic themes were primary in only about 4% of stories.

4. The Effect of Exposure to Economic Ads

Did individual-level exposure to televised campaign ads condition the strength of the economic vote? Multinomial logit estimates of the models used to generate the economic voting scores of Table 3 of the main text are presented in Table A2. Specifically, I present estimates of a "fully specified" model, a "sparsely specified" model, and estimates of a model in which exposure to televised ads is not weighted by a respondent's television-watching habits. As predicted by priming theory, the coefficient estimate for the interaction between exposure to economic messages and economic retrospections is negative (because "Calderón is the omitted category) and highly significant (p=0.01) in all three specifications.

<<TABLE A2 HERE>>

5. Exposure to Economic Ads and the Salience of the Economy

Did the salience of economic considerations increase with exposure to the economic message as priming theory predicts? As described in the main text, I evaluate this possibility by regressing a measure of economic salience on exposure to economic ads. I define economic salience as a binary variable that equals 1 if a respondent reported an economic issue as the most important problem facing the nation. I control for prior salience, party identification, and exposure to the campaign more broadly. In a "fully specified" model, I also include the series of controls used to estimate the effect of economic ads on the strength of the economic vote. Logit estimates of these models are presented in Table A3 and reveal that the salience of the economy increased significantly with exposure to economic ads. It is unlikely that this effect is observed by chance (p<0.05 in both models).

<<TABLE A3 HERE>>

6. Variable Coding and Model Estimates, Mexico 2000

As noted in the text, I use data from the four-wave Mexico 2000 Panel Study.

Vote Intention/Report	0=Labastida, 1=Fox, 2=Cárdenas
Economic Retrospection	"In the last 12 months, would you say that the national economy has gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same?" 0=A lot worse, 0.25=A little worse, 0.5=Stayed the same, 0.75=A little better, 1=A lot better
Panista/Priista/Perredista	0=Does not identify with the party, 1=Identifies with the party; Note: "leaners" are categorized as identifiers and "non-identifiers" are the base category in the analysis.
Privatization	"With which of the following phrases do you most agree?" 0= Privatizing the electric industry would be bad for the country, 1=The electric industry should be privatized to make it more efficient.
Poverty	"With which of the following phrases do you most agree?" 0= The government should do more to reduce the differences between rich and poor, 1=Attempts by the government to reduce the differences between rich and poor cause more problems than they solve.
Risk Taker	"I am going to read two sayings; please tell me which of the two is closest to your way of thinking?" 0=Better the devil you know than the saint you don't, 1=Nothing ventured, nothing gained.
Interest in Politics	"How much interest do you have in politics?" 0=None, 0.33=A little, 0.66=Some, 1=A lot
Income	Socioeconomic status of the respondent's dwelling. 0=f 0.2=e, d=.4, c=.6, b=.8, a=1.
Female	0=Male, 1=Female
Education	0=No schooling, 0.25=primary, 0.5=secondary, 0.75=preparatory, 1=college

Based on this coding scheme, the multinomial logit estimate of the model of vote choice described in the text are presented in Table A4. In addition, Table A5 presents "sparse"

specifications of this model and the estimated economic vote for each as a robustness check on

the results displayed in Figure 4 of the main text.

<<TABLE A4 AND TABLE A5 HERE>>

Table A1: A Multi-Wave Test of Priming in the 2006 Mexican Presidential Election

DV: Vote Choice/Intent	Wave 1 (October 2005)				Wave 2 (May 2006)				Wave 3: Post (July 2006)			
	Madrazo	AMLO	Madrazo	AMLO	Madrazo	AMLO	Madrazo	AMLO	Madrazo	AMLO	Madrazo	AMLO
Economy	-2.82*	-2.67*	-2.58*	-2.68*	-0.68	-1.06*	-0.55	-1.02*	-1.85*	-1.53*	-1.68*	-1.52*
	(0.83)	(0.40)	(0.75)	(0.47)	(0.58)	(0.45)	(0.63)	(0.40)	(0.59)	(0.40)	(0.66)	(0.37)
Perredista	14.51*	17.15*	15.19*	17.27*	1.09	1.26*	1.10	1.34*	0.47	1.16*	0.47	1.24*
	(1.06)	(0.72)	(0.93)	(0.67)	(0.69)	(0.46)	(0.68)	(0.46)	(0.64)	(0.39)	(0.56)	(0.43)
Priista	3.19**	0.88*	3.69*	0.96*	1.69*	-0.10	1.83*	-0.13	1.04	-0.76*	1.08	-0.66
	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.42)	(0.72)	(0.35)	(0.69)	(0.37)	(0.73)	(0.35)	(0.70)	(0.34)
Panista	-1.67*	-2.26*	-1.37*	-2.23*	0.76	-0.14	0.82	-0.19	-0.74	-0.74*	-0.76	-0.68*
	(0.58)	(0.35)	(0.54)	(0.34)	(0.73)	(0.37)	(0.68)	(0.37)	(0.54)	(0.36)	(0.56)	(0.34)
Privatization	-0.08	0.02			-0.02	-0.06			-0.09	-0.30		
	(0.41)	(0.26)			(0.40)	(0.47)			(0.45)	(0.40)		
US Trade	-0.30	-0.07			0.02	-0.34			0.19	0.06		
	(0.51)	(0.39)			(0.64)	(0.47)			(0.36)	(0.30)		
Security	-0.14	0.09			-0.43	0.00			-0.60*	0.03		
	(0.38)	(0.30)			(0.34)	(0.27)			(0.29)	(0.31)		
Poverty	-0.28	0.17			0.03	-0.21			0.05	-0.18		
	(0.43)	(0.36)			(0.33)	(0.41)			(0.32)	(0.31)		
Madrazo Probability	8.35**	1.22			2.09*	-0.11			0.74	-0.07		
	(1.47)	(1.15)			(0.64)	(0.63)			(0.85)	(0.58)		
Religiosity	0.22	-0.28			-0.23	-0.30			0.28	-0.66*		
	(0.31)	(0.33)			(0.30)	(0.41)			(0.40)	(0.31)		
Light-skinned	-0.53	-0.35			-0.73*	-0.37			-0.12	-0.10		
	(0.38)	(0.35)			(0.28)	(0.27)			(0.41)	(0.27)		
Income	-2.28*	-0.37			-0.94	-1.45*			-0.74	-0.82		
	(0.83)	(0.72)			(0.84)	(0.62)			(0.68)	(0.66)		
Female	1.07*	-0.02			-0.51	-0.18			-0.85*	-0.51		
	(0.28)	(0.34)			(0.49)	(0.28)			(0.32)	(0.30)		
Interest in Politics	-0.89	-0.38			-0.29	-0.27			0.25	-0.38		

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	(0.71)	(0.49)			(0.60)	(0.44)			(0.63)	(0.44)		
Calderón Vote Intent					-2.50*	-0.01	-3.61*	-1.49*	-1.55	0.55	-2.14*	-0.63
					(0.87)	(0.47)	(1.01)	(0.45)	(0.80)	(0.76)	(0.74)	(0.47)
Madrazo Vote Intent					1.34	1.85*	0.51	0.49	1.60*	1.89*	0.96	0.68
					(0.79)	(0.49)	(0.83)	(0.37)	(0.77)	(0.62)	(0.59)	(0.40)
AMLO Vote Intent					-0.56	3.32*	-1.61*	1.78*	0.26	3.35*	-0.32	2.16*
					(0.75)	(0.53)	(0.71)	(0.34)	(0.78)	(0.73)	(0.49)	(0.31)
Constant	-0.37	2.28*	0.57	2.02*								
	(1.18)	(0.68)	(0.69)	(0.40)								
Economic Vote	**0.01***		**0.01***		**0.23***		**0.21***		**0.38***		**0.37***	
	(<0.01)		(<0.01)		(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Pseudo R^2	0.56		0.48		0.51		0.49		0.46		0.44	

N=599. Multinomial logit estimates with robust standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses. "Calderón" is the baseline category. All independent variables are scaled from 0 to 1. * $p < 0.05$.

Figure A1. News Coverage of the Economy and Televised Economic Ads, 2006

Note: The calculations of both the total number of news stories in each month and the total number of ads aired are weighted by the extent of economic content.

Table A2: A Test of the Conditioning Effect of Economic Campaign Ads, 2006

	Full Specification		Sparse Specification		Non-Weighted [a]	
DV: Vote Choice (Wave 3)	Madrazo	AMLO	Madrazo	AMLO	Madrazo	AMLO
Total Campaign Ads	-4.64	4.28	-5.10	-4.96	-4.18	9.92
	(11.95)	(21.68)	(15.17)	(20.42)	(6.66)	(9.35)
Economic Campaign Ads	19.34	4.89	18.03	16.42	11.01	-10.14
	(18.16)	(32.99)	(23.13)	(31.08)	(10.10)	(14.03)
Economy (W1)	-0.16	1.18	-0.15	0.31	0.12	1.23
	(1.23)	(1.36)	(1.30)	(1.04)	(1.31)	(1.50)
*Economy * Economic Ads*	-21.55*	-17.80*	-18.85*	-13.93*	-9.92*	-6.23*
	(6.14)	(4.93)	(5.69)	(3.79)	(3.08)	(2.16)
Perredista	-0.38	1.11	-0.52	0.92*	-0.38	0.98
	(0.96)	(0.67)	(0.89)	(0.45)	(0.96)	(0.64)
Priista	0.61	0.10	0.28	-0.33	0.56	-0.04
	(0.68)	(0.31)	(0.72)	(0.48)	(0.68)	(0.33)
Panista	-1.91*	-1.63**	-1.76	-1.50**	-1.99*	-1.63*
	(0.97)	(0.61)	(0.98)	(0.56)	(0.97)	(0.63)
Privatization	-0.15	-0.46			-0.06	-0.44
	(0.44)	(0.69)			(0.46)	(0.70)
US Trade	-0.18	-0.83*			-0.22	-0.77*
	(0.53)	(0.38)			(0.54)	(0.38)
Security	0.46	0.14			0.38	0.07
	(0.36)	(0.41)			(0.41)	(0.45)
Poverty	-0.01	-0.29			0.03	-0.38
	(0.39)	(0.43)			(0.38)	(0.44)
Pr(PRI victory)	-0.47	-3.03*			-0.44	-2.99*
	(0.95)	(0.77)			(0.95)	(0.81)
Religiosity	0.92	-0.46			0.80	-0.45
	(0.53)	(0.50)			(0.57)	(0.47)
Light-skinned	0.14	0.30			0.13	0.23
	(0.63)	(0.42)			(0.63)	(0.44)
Income	0.19	0.51			0.40	0.51
	(0.90)	(0.90)			(0.90)	(0.89)
Female	-0.04	-1.42*			-0.10	-1.47*
	(0.34)	(0.44)			(0.34)	(0.44)
Interest in Politics	-0.76	-0.17			-0.78	-0.10
	(0.62)	(0.58)			(0.57)	(0.58)
Calderón Vote Intention (W2)	-4.49*	-0.87	-4.22*	-2.09*	-4.34*	-1.13
	(1.33)	(0.85)	(1.31)	(0.74)	(1.28)	(0.94)
AMLO Vote Intention (W2)	-0.66	3.41*	-0.43	1.93*	-0.60	3.11*
	(0.96)	(0.74)	(0.75)	(0.58)	(0.98)	(0.84)
Madrazo Vote Intention (W2)	1.23	0.27	1.44	-1.29	1.30	0.11
	(0.73)	(0.87)	(0.76)	(0.78)	(0.75)	(0.86)
Pseudo R^2	0.68		0.65		0.68	

[a] Advertising calculations in Model 3 are not weighted by respondents' television-watching habits.

N=447. Multinomial logit estimates with robust standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses. Calderón is the baseline category. Unless otherwise noted, all variables are measured using Wave 2 responses. * $p<0.05$.

Table A3: The Effect of Economic Ads on the Salience of Economic Retrospections, 2006

	DV: Economy is the Most Important Problem (Wave 3)	
Economic Campaign Ads	50.23*	49.41*
	(23.89)	(21.08)
Total Campaign Ads	-35.66*	-35.26*
	(15.66)	(13.76)
MIP: Econ (W2)	2.08*	2.15**
	(0.28)	(0.27)
Perredista	0.57*	0.50*
	(0.27)	(0.25)
Priista	0.16	0.17
	(0.33)	(0.28)
Panista	0.14	0.26
	(0.37)	(0.32)
Interest in Politics		0.86*
		(0.41)
Privatization		-0.38
		(0.31)
US Trade		-0.30
		(0.53)
Security		0.13
		(0.21)
Poverty		-0.30
		(0.22)
Religiosity		0.19
		(0.51)
Light-skinned		-0.16
		(0.29)
Income		-1.05
		(0.59)
Female		-0.22
		(0.15)
Constant	-1.42*	-0.91*
	(0.29)	(0.39)
Pseudo R^2	0.19	0.21

N=383. Logit estimates with robust standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses. All variables are measured using Wave 2 responses. * $p < 0.05$.

Table A4: A Test of Economic Priming in the 2000 Mexican Presidential Campaign

DV: Vote Choice/Intent	WAVE 1 February 19 - 27		WAVE 2 April 28 - 7 May		WAVE 3 June 3 - 18		WAVE 4 (Post-Elec) July 7 - 16	
	Fox	Cárdenas	Fox	Cárdenas	Fox	Cárdenas	Fox	Cárdenas
Economy	-1.85*	-0.55	0.79	-0.27	-0.40	-0.82	0.13	-0.76
	(0.74)	(0.93)	(0.99)	(1.12)	(0.84)	(0.97)	(0.59)	(0.77)
Panista	2.99*	0.19	-0.62	-1.42	-0.17	-0.95	-0.00	-0.48
	(0.53)	(0.80)	(0.82)	(0.97)	(0.66)	(0.77)	(0.50)	(0.65)
Priista	-3.02*	-3.27*	-1.12	-1.00	-0.53	-1.45*	-0.67	-0.73
	(0.39)	(0.60)	(0.61)	(0.77)	(0.50)	(0.56)	(0.37)	(0.51)
Perredista	-0.52	3.09**	-0.19	2.31*	0.25	1.14	0.11	1.00
	(0.67)	(0.58)	(0.94)	(0.83)	(0.88)	(0.72)	(0.60)	(0.60)
Privatization	-0.48	-1.22*	-0.27	-1.09*	-0.02	-0.55	-0.00	-0.56
	(0.33)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.52)	(0.35)	(0.42)	(0.25)	(0.34)
Poverty	0.25	0.05	-0.69	-1.22*	-0.05	-0.17	-0.37	0.20
	(0.33)	(0.41)	(0.46)	(0.53)	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.26)	(0.33)
Risk Taker	0.95*	0.66	0.32	0.67	0.83*	0.85	0.56*	1.06*
	(0.35)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.52)	(0.38)	(0.45)	(0.26)	(0.38)
Interest in Politics	1.43*	0.43	0.69	2.02*	0.41	0.30	0.04	0.37
	(0.58)	(0.73)	(0.75)	(0.87)	(0.61)	(0.69)	(0.45)	(0.57)
Income	-0.35	-0.58	-0.90	-1.38	-0.34	-2.05	-0.42	-1.23
	(0.79)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.18)	(0.88)	(1.08)	(0.61)	(0.82)
Female	0.07	-0.10	0.60	0.74	0.71	0.17	0.15	-0.57
	(0.33)	(0.41)	(0.45)	(0.53)	(0.37)	(0.41)	(0.26)	(0.34)
Education	1.12	1.14	0.04	0.68	1.48*	1.90*	1.14*	1.17
	(0.62)	(0.78)	(0.85)	(1.00)	(0.65)	(0.76)	(0.50)	(0.64)
Labastida Vote			-2.00*	-2.82*	-2.61*	-1.50	-1.32*	-1.82*
			(0.90)	(1.09)	(0.81)	(0.85)	(0.56)	(0.72)
Fox Vote			3.10*	0.94	1.15	0.37	1.69*	-0.15
			(1.03)	(1.18)	(0.85)	(0.97)	(0.61)	(0.80)
Cárdenas Vote			-0.25	-0.09	-2.19*	0.39	-0.23	0.59
			(0.98)	(1.05)	(0.93)	(0.89)	(0.67)	(0.77)
Constant	-0.39	-0.86						
	(0.62)	(0.76)						
Economic Vote	**0.40***		**-0.13**		**0.12**		**0.01**	
	(0.18)		(0.23)		(0.18)		(0.12)	
Observations	548		333		355		548	
Pseudo R^2	0.57		0.53		0.43		0.35	

Note: Mulitnomial logit estimates with standard errors in parentheses. "Labastida" is the baseline category. All independent variables are measured using Wave 1 responses. * $p<0.05$.

Table A5: Robustness Tests, Mexico 2000

DV=Vote Choice	Wave 1		Wave 2		Wave 3		Wave 4	
	Fox	Cárdenas	Fox	Cárdenas	Fox	Cárdenas	Fox	Cárdenas
Economy	-1.84*	-0.84	0.70	-0.61	-0.19	-0.66	0.18	-0.79
	(0.69)	(0.88)	(0.96)	(1.06)	(0.79)	(0.91)	(0.57)	(0.73)
Panista	2.96*	0.10	-0.56	-1.27	-0.14	-0.93	0.03	-0.49
	(0.51)	(0.78)	(0.80)	(0.94)	(0.64)	(0.75)	(0.49)	(0.64)
Priista	-3.05*	-3.37*	-0.89	-0.74	-0.44	-1.34*	-0.76*	-0.86
	(0.35)	(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.71)	(0.47)	(0.52)	(0.35)	(0.49)
Perredista	-0.58	2.72*	-0.36	1.76*	0.18	0.84	-0.01	0.77
	(0.62)	(0.52)	(0.88)	(0.73)	(0.85)	(0.68)	(0.58)	(0.57)
Prior Labastida Vote			-1.90*	-1.99*	-1.10	-0.88	-0.59	-1.20*
			(0.68)	(0.74)	(0.59)	(0.63)	(0.43)	(0.55)
Prior Fox Intent			3.13*	1.81*	2.88*	1.28	2.51*	0.82
			(0.81)	(0.87)	(0.66)	(0.74)	(0.48)	(0.58)
Prior Cárdenas Vote			-0.07	0.80	-0.43	1.38*	0.59	1.44*
			(0.77)	(0.74)	(0.75)	(0.65)	(0.56)	(0.58)
Constant	1.23*	-0.17						
	(0.38)	(0.49)						
Economic Vote	**0.41***		**-0.08**		**0.07**		**0.01**	
	(0.16)		(0.21)		(0.17)		(0.12)	
Observations	548		333		355		548	
Pseudo R^2	0.54		0.50		0.40		0.32	

Note: Mulitnomial logit estimates with standard errors in parentheses. "Labastida" is the baseline category. All independent variables are measured using Wave 1 responses. * p<0.05.